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Dear Harvey,
I take the occasion of this tribute issue, and your
appointment as co-Reporter of the Restatement project on
General Principles of Torts, to venture a few remarks on that
project.'
The 1999 Discussion Draft (hereafter, Draft), which I use as
a point of departure, augurs an important contribution to the
law. It is an admirable first cut at a subject of considerable
difficulty.2 My reflections on the complexity of setting out
general principles for Torts lead me to conclude that in its own
way, this task may rival the demands of the decanal position
© Copyright held by Marshall S. Shapo 2000.
* Frederic P. Vose Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. I am grate-
ful for support from the Clemens and Jane Werner Faculty Enrichment Fund.
1. My remarks are, of course, directed also to Gary Schwartz, your co-reporter.
2. To emphasize my limited qualifications as a witness, I note that my references to
the Draft are based on a first reading only of key provisions, rather than careful
scrutiny of the Draft as a whole. My purpose here is to use the Draft to put some
ideas in play, rather than to do close critical commentary.
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you have just left, and in which you served so long and with
such distinction.
I. GENERAL ISSUES
Here are some of the broader problems that I see in this enterprise:
A. Overall Architecture
The first question concerns the overall architecture of the project.
The Draft jumps right into the doctrinal pond with definitions of in-
tent and recklessness.3 Should there be a prefatory section that ex-
plains what Torts is, to define for the reader the subject matter that is
based on the general principles? This also implicates the question of
whether there should be an initial, compressed description of the mul-
tiple rationales of tort law.4 I elaborate on this issue separately below.
A correlative point, something in the nature of a lament, concerns
the prior birth of one full published Third Torts Restatement and the
imminent birth of another.5 Some observers, myself included, had
thought that you couldn't effectively restate a subject comprehensively
if you did piecemeal quilting beforehand. One need point only, illus-
tratively, to the Product's Restatement's conflation of several doc-
trines, including negligence and strict liability, under its defect
umbrella, 6 and suggest that the General Principles Restatement may
have to play a catch-up game in, for example, its efforts to define negli-
gence. 7 And one might mourn the opportunity to establish general
principles of contributory fault in a General Principles Restatement
before setting them out in the Apportionment Restatement.8 So much
for spilt gallons. The present project must deal with the world as it is,
including the existing world of Restatements Third.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 1 (Discussion
Draft April 5, 1999) [hereinafter, "DRAF'].
4. See 1984 A.B.A. Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, TowARDS A JU-
RISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUED CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW: REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ch.
4 (Marshall S. Shapo, Reporter) (summarizing "purposes and policy goals of tort
law").
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABmITY (1998) [hereinafter, "PRoD-
ucTs RESTATEMENT'1; RESTATEMENT (THID) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABa_
ITY (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) March 22, 1999) [hereinafter,
"APPORTIONMENT DRAFTI.
6. See, e.g., PRODuCs RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 1, cmt. a, at 7-8 (saying that
as long as "functional criteria" of defect provisions are met, "courts may utilize
the terminology of negligence, strict liability, or the implied warranty of
merchantability, or simply define liability in the terms set forth in the black
letter").
7. Now essayed in DRAFT §§ 3 & 4.
8. See, e.g., APPORTIONMENT DRAFT, supra note 5, at §§ 3-5.
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It is not news that the range of the subject matter creates obstacles
to the formulation of general principles. One can see, without too
much difficulty, a parallel between such seemingly disparate torts as
defamation and assault and battery.9 It is harder, perhaps, to discern
the generalizations that will connect, for example, intentional inter-
ference with contract -with negligent infliction of emotional distress-
not to say that there are not very broad foundational ideas on which
both rest.
B. Diversity of Opinion on Rationales
A related point concerns the breadth of the spectrum of philosophi-
cal points of view on torts, at least among academic observers of tort
law. Of course, practically all torts teachers, no matter what theoreti-
cal banner they fly, probably agree on, and teach, basically the same
fundamentals. But to try to reconcile the views of policy espoused by
corrective justice advocates, traditional instrumentalists, devotees of
law and economics, feminists, and socialists calls for a different, and
perhaps impossible, order of harmonization.
This leads me to the fact that the present Draft, perhaps as a mat-
ter of prudential choice, does not try to set out in one place a catalog of
the rationales, goals or purposes of tort law generally. That may be
the better part of valor, but it does leave open the question, especially
in a statement of general principles, of what the chemical composition
of their foundation is. This might be particularly ironic to students,
who we always challenge to state the reason for the rule. A partial
answer is that tort rationales can only be meaningful in application to
particular doctrines.
A related question is at what level of precision one should try to
identify the rationales of tort law, if one undertakes to do so. The
Draft refers to a cluster of rationales-"fairness," "providing... ap-
propriate safety incentives," and "broadly humanitarian goals"-in a
comment to the blackletter definition of negligence.10 One may con-
trast this supple pluralism, which on the whole I find congenial, with
the insistence of the Reporters for the Products Restatement on pin-
ning its design defect rules to a risk-utility base.1
9. See, e.g., MRsHALL S. SHApo, Tim DUTY To AcT xv (1977) "[0]ne may use words
or pictures to achieve the same lacerative or searing effects of fists, guns, and
radiation).
10. DRAFT § 4, cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) March 22, 1999) ("rationales for
negligence liability").
11. PRODUCTS RESTATEAENT, supra note 5, at § 2, cmt. d.
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
C. Approaches to Restatement
Now I mention an issue that is endemic to Restatements: the ques-
tion of what basic approach the restaters should take to their subject.
In previous work on the Products Restatement, I identified three ap-
proaches-the literalist, or abacus, attempt to count decisions; the ap-
proach that seeks "wisdom and excellence"; and a "frank legislative
approach."1 2
We may put aside, for the moment, the legislative approach, which
in general is not as potentially pertinent to a general principles re-
statement as to a products restatement-although I recognize that
political arguments will rear up from time to time concerning what
principles are general.
Whatever competition there is between approaches to this project,
it would appear, will be between the abacus approach and the search
for wisdom and excellence. As to the abacus approach, since there are
galaxies of reported decisions on many of the subjects covered in the
Draft, with innumerable factual refinements, it would seem impracti-
cal to try to classify and count them.
If the default choice is to seek wisdom, however, this places an es-
pecially heavy burden on those who try to define what wisdom consists
of. There is a particular obligation of self-restraint on the part of re-
porters, whose choice of rules and formulas is naturally likely, at im-
portant margins, to reflect their own favored ideas or betes noire. This
goes especially for the selection and discussion of rationales. To epito-
mize the problem, the task is, insofar as possible, to restate rather
than to ruminate.
II. SPECIFIC ISSUES
I now turn to a number of more specific issues that may prove
among the more vexatious ones.
A. The Definition of Negligence
In quantitative litigation terms, negligence law is the heart of
torts. Therefore, it would be good, if it were possible, to try to reach
consensus about the general definition of negligence.
The difficulty of that enterprise is evident when one considers the
range of locutions of negligence. Start with the definition in section
282 of the Second Restatement that "negligence is conduct which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm."13 Now note the Draft's definition
12. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restate-
ment Project, 48 VANrD. L. REv. 631, 634-35 (1995).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
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of a failure to "exercise reasonable care under all the circum-
stances."'14 Compare Shaw's reference, in Brown v. Kendall, to "that
kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use,
such as is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is neces-
sary to guard against probable danger."' 5 Compare also Brett's refer-
ence to the "ordinary care and skill" exercised by the thinking person
who "would at once recognise" danger to the person or property of
another.16
Now superimpose on these formulas the Learned Hand test,17
which employs a cost-cost analysis; the frequent references in deci-
sions to risk-benefit comparison;' 8 the still different phraseology of
risk-utility;19 and the concept of the cheapest cost avoider.20
One response to the problem of harmonization created by the di-
versity of terminology in this catalog is that it is just that - terminol-
ogy - that it all stands for pretty much the same concept, and that all
members of the guild know what that concept is. As readers of Homer
know that the Great Earth Shaker and Poseidon are one and the
same, lawyers understand that different legal epithets may stand for
the same thing. Certainly, we know that epithets are not concepts.
Perhaps too many people have too much investment in each of
these terms that it would be a waste of intellectual resources to try to
bring them under a single, standardized linguistic roof. But perhaps
also the problem is an even more difficult one; maybe the different
phrases stand for different ideas. Yet, I am suggesting that if there
are general principles of negligence, it would be useful at least to ex-
plore the fashioning of a consensus definition.
An interesting exercise would be to have all one hundred-plus
members of the Members Consultative Group for the General Princi-
ples project give their own preferred definitions of negligence. Then
we would know if we have a potential consensus or a Tower of Babel. I
speculate that torts specialists of all stripes think that everyone
knows negligence when she sees it and believe that almost everyone's
perceptions converge closely. But it would be helpful to know just
what the level of agreement is. (In this discussion I do not pause to
discuss the negligence that many observers see in strict liability for
14. DRAT § 4.
15. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292, 296 (Mass. 1850).
16. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883).
17. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
18. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 238 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993).
20. See, e.g., Gumo CALABREsI, THE CoSTs OF ACCIDENTS 135-40 (1970).
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products, 21 not to mention the confusion engendered in many students
by the use of the phrase negligence per se.)
B. Contributory Fault
I have adverted to the strategic problem created by publishing the
sections on claimant fault of the Apportionment project before the
drafting of General Principles. As able and dedicated a job as the Ap-
portionment reporters did, this may tend to paint General Principles
into a doctrinal corner, or corners. The brief discussion of "negligence
and contributory negligence" in a comment to section 4 of the Draft,22
observing that "[t]here are certain differences in emphasis between"
the two, only begins to represent the shadings of definition that your
co-Reporter excellently captured two decades ago.2 3 I note, in this
connection, that there seems at least superficially to be a difference
between the section 4 comment and the subhead in the proposed final
draft of the Apportionment Restatement that declares "[p]laintiffs
negligence same as defendant's negligence."24
I am not sure how to get out of this corner. One way to do it is to
have a separate section on contributory negligence. This would re-
quire a blackletter that tries to create a treaty with the Apportion-
ment Restatement, insofar as the relevant actors can agree on the
terms of the treaty.
C. Strict Liability and Negligence
I take it that the General Principles draft eventually will extend to
strict liability, at least apart from products.25 In doing so, it will have
to deal with such complex doctrinal relationships as those between
strict liability and negligence, and strict liability and nuisance. (I can
note only in passing that the exclusion of products will require ignor-
ing a complex body of case law that provides special challenges to
those who would restate general principles of torts.)26
To state "general principles" of torts, it will be necessary to suggest
answers to questions like these: How much of strict liability is really
21. See, e.g., Sheila Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negli-
gence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VArD. L. REv. 593 (1980).
22. DRAFT § 4, cmt. b.
23. See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal,
87 YALE L. J. 697 (1978).
24. APPORTIONMENT DRAFT, supra note 5, at § 3, cmt. a. I am informed by Professor
William Powers, a co-Reporter of the APPORTOmMNT RESTATEMENT, that
although this language will be changed in the published Restatement, the sub-
stance will remain the same.
25. See DRAFT xxi (Reporter's Introductory Note).
26. See, e.g., 2 MARSHALL S. SHA'o, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIALITY (3d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 1999) T 26.03-05 (discussing comparisons and contrasts among strict liabil-
ity, warranty and negligence).
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an exaggerated version of negligence? And, more generally, how much
of strict liability is really strict? Is it true that Traynor saw through
the res ipsa mask to an underlying strict liability more than half a
century ago,2 7 and there is too much case law indicating that the con-
cepts really are different to view them as equivalents. 28 But, con-
versely, we also do know that often strict liability is a mask for
suspicions of negligence. 29
D. Judge and Jury
The Draft's section on judge and juryO is suitably modest with re-
spect to the negligence/standard of care issue. I simply note that this
subject will require considerable further discussion with respect to the
duty/proximate cause issue. The section labeled "Duty" in the Draft is
rather compressed in its references to the roles of judge and jury.3 1
Confronting this problem in its broadest compass will be trying to
catch the proverbial tiger by the tail. I wonder, in this regard, what
parts of Green's duty question,3 2 if any, will be covered by later parts
of the Draft as "doctrines of... proximate causation"?3 3
In connection with this problem, so much a part of the basic fabric
of tort law, I make reference to a particular interest of mine: the way
that tort law reflects culture.34 Of course, judges do not deliberately
set out to conform their decisions to prevailing attitudes. But I think
that restaters of General Principles of Torts ought, as a descriptive
matter, refer to the way that judges' thinking is conditioned by cul-
ture. Indeed, Cardozo, one of the progenitors of the Restatements,
self-consciously described such aspects of his thinking process.3 5
27. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (separate opinion of Traynor, J.).
28. See, e.g., SnApo, supra note 26, at 26.04 [2].
29. See, e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174
(7th Cir. 1990).
30. DRAr § 5.
31. See DRAFr § 6, cmt. c ("[tihe proper role for duty in unusual cases"); cmt. e
("[a]dministrability"); cmt. h (courts' breadth of perspective greater than that of
juries).
32. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 1, 28 COLUm. L. REv.
1014 (1928); The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. Rlv. 255
(1929).
33. See DRArr xxi (Reporter's Introductory Note.)
34. See, e.g., SHAPo, supra note 26, at vii (discussing cultural symbolism of products);
MARsHALL S. SHAPo, PRoDUCTs LImBIraY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUsTicE 73-91
(1993) ("Cognition and Choice in a Mass Culture"); Marshall S. Shapo, In the
Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the American Expe-
rience, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1567-69 (1995) (speaking of"the proper role ofjudges as
interpreters of culture as well as law").
35. See, e.g., BF JAAnN M. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 66-75,
104-13, 167-69 (1921).
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E. The "Core of Tort Law": What to Include
It would be well to reflect further about two subjects specifically
excluded from this Draft. The Reporter's Introductory Note says that
"given its focus on the core of tort law," the Draft "does not itself con-
sider liability for emotional distress or economic loss." 36 What is "the
core of tort law?" That portentous question would probably get at
least 250 answers from any 100 members of my proposed focus group,
the Members Consultative Group.
More specifically, the proposed exclusions would probably raise a
number of eyebrows. Are we to assume that the Second Restatement's
position on negligently inflicted emotional distress37 continues to rep-
resent the considered position of the A.L.I.? Is the decision to exclude
this issue attributable to its degree of particularity? If history is an
indicator of the core-ness of a question, one may observe that there is
a long history of tort-like law in which a cluster of analogous issues
are central.38
The economic loss issue so bedevils our jurisprudence that it seems
at least arguable that it is sufficiently general to include in a state-
ment of "general principles." The Products Restatement spoke to the
issue in a section39 that did not include nuances that seem important
to me,40 but it did speak. Will a Third Restatement project subsequent
to General Principles try to define this subject? This is not just a
storm on the horizon. There has been considerable thunder and light-
ning for years.4 1 I don't want to suggest a premature leap to judgment
on the issue, but this is a topic on which the law cries out for guidance,
36. DRAFT xxi (Reporter's Introductory Note).
37. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §436A (1965).
38. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality , 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 356-57
(1915) (summarizing, inter alia, Greek and Roman law on injuries to
"personality").
39. PRODucTs RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 21 & cmt. a (opposing tort suits for
"pure economic loss").
40. A comment makes reference to the principal problem of this kind, that of eco-
nomic loss caused by "products that are dangerous." Id., cmt. d.
41. See, e.g., People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495
A.2d 107 (1985) (upholding cause of action for airline that sued for business inter-
ruption expenses attributable to negligence that allegedly caused fire requiring
evacuation of nearby airport terminal). Compare Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding a claim stated for commercial fishermen for fish
kills in oil spill case), with Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d
1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying recovery to diverse plaintiffs, including recreational
fishermen, for injuries to marine life from chemical spill). Compare East River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (holding no recovery
for "purely economic" loss associated with malfunctions in turbines on supertank-
ers), with Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Central Flying Servs., Inc., 975 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.
1992) (affirming plaintiffs judgment for economic losses attributable to plane be-
ing so corroded that it was "economically unfeasible" to repair).
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even the guidance of a draft that does no more than summarize au-
thorities and points of view and leaves courts to develop the law.
HI. CONCLUSION
This brief essay is only suggestive. There is much more that could
be said about both general philosophy and specifics, and I have not
even touched on the majority of sections in the Draft. I have tried
here only to identify some matters of general concern related to the
process of restating, and a few particulars that seem of quantitative
importance.
I can epitomize my most basic view of the subject by saying that
General Principles should be informed, as much as possible, by gen-
eral principles.
I close on an entirely personal note. I have known you as a friend
and colleague, as a scholar,42 and as one of the most valuable contrib-
utors to the work of the American Law Institute over many years. I
have learned to value your integrity and your judgment. Having no
first-hand knowledge of your work as Dean - the occasion for this
tribute issue - I can only fall back on my own intuition for the belief
that these qualities have done you proud in that job. We all look for-
ward to your enhanced contributions to the law as you return to full
time teaching.
42. Most notably, in my own research work, for Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with
Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doc-
trine, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 61 (1982).
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